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EMBODIED VS. NON-EMBODIED MODES OF KNOWING
IN AQUINAS: DIFFERENT UNIVERSALS, DIFFERENT
INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES, DIFFERENT INTELLECTS
Therese Scarpelli Cory

What does it mean to be an embodied thinker of abstract concepts? Does embodiment shape the character and quality of our understanding of universals such
as “dog” and “beauty,” and would a non-embodied mind understand such
concepts differently? I examine these questions through the lens of Thomas
Aquinas’s remarks on the differences between embodied (human) intellects
and non-embodied (angelic) intellects. In Aquinas, I argue, the difference
between embodied and non-embodied intellection of extramental realities is
rooted in the fact that embodied and non-embodied intellects grasp different
kinds of universals by means of different kinds of intelligible species (intellectual likenesses), which elicit in them different “modes” of understanding. By
spelling out what exactly it means to be an embodied knower, on Aquinas’s
account, I argue, we can also shed new light on his mysterious claim that the
embodied intellect “turns to phantasms”—the imagination’s likenesses of individuals—in its acts of understanding.

One of the interesting questions, for theories that ascribe to us some sort
of immaterial part (a soul or mind), concerns the extent to which being an
embodied mind has distinctive repercussions on our conscious life. Some
features of our conscious life seem distinctively bodily, e.g., the feeling of
being oriented in space and the awareness of the relative position of one’s
body parts (proprioception). But apart from proprioception, the way forward is not so clear, as the following two puzzles illustrate. On the one
hand, assuming that an immaterial mind should be capable of at least some
mental activities that are independent from physiological structures, one
might wonder whether these activities, in us, are just the same kind as those
of non-embodied minds—or whether there is something unique about the
immaterial activities of an embodied mind. On the other hand, where our
mental activities seem linked in some way to a physiological structure, one
might wonder how essential those structures are for rendering the kinds
of experiences we have. Is it in principle possible to have the experience
pp. 417–446

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 35 No. 4 October 2018
doi: 10.5840/faithphil20181023113
All rights reserved

418

Faith and Philosophy

“hearing Beethoven’s Ninth” without the relevant physiological apparatus
of eardrum, auditory nerve, brainstem, auditory cortex? For instance: If
a non-embodied mind had been present for the opening night of Beethoven’s Ninth (setting aside concerns about how a non-embodied mind gains
entrance to an auditorium!), it is not obvious whether it would have (i) the
experience that we call “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth,” or (ii) a different kind
of experience of musical sounds, or (iii) no experience of musical sounds
at all.
These two puzzles are just two ways into the same problem: What difference does embodiment make to the qualitative feel and content of human
experience? In this study, I intend to unpack how this problem is handled
by the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas often uses angelic cognition as a counterpoint in discussing human cognition (and vice versa),
producing especially sharp and revealing contrasts between embodied vs.
non-embodied conscious experience. On his view, our conscious life is a
whole constituted by the activities of multiple mental powers. Embodied
minds have—and non-embodied minds lack—many kinds of essentially
bodily mental activities, i.e., sensory and imaginative activities. Where we
have kinship with angels, however, is in the non-bodily activity of intellect
(let us call it “knowing”), which accounts for our ability to think about
universals such as “dog” or “beauty,” and to grasp things as instances of
some common kind, e.g., as a dog or as beautiful.1 But Aquinas resists the
implication that our intellectual knowing is basically an angelic activity
mixed in with bodily sensory activities, arguing instead that there is something distinctive about embodied knowing.2
But distinctive in what way? The usual answer in the Aquinas scholar
ship is to point to something that amounts to a merely quantitative
difference: Embodied knowing is characterized by its discursivity (use
of propositions and arguments), which is the result of how little we are
able to grasp intellectually in a single act. Thus angelic intellects intuit
whole swathes of reality at once, while we must put the picture together
piecemeal by constructing propositions and arguments.3 On this standard
1
There is also an accompanying non-bodily power of will, but I am only focusing on
cognitive powers here.
2
Indeed, it is crucial to Aquinas’s campaign to secure a unified human substance, that
human souls and angels be different kinds of intellectual forms. ST I 75.7, I 88.2 ad 3; see also
In III Sent. d.23 1.2 ad 2; I 88.2 ad 3. So it is not surprising that he would also think that their
mental activity must be different in kind. In referencing and citing the works of Aquinas, I
have used the Leonine edition for all the works cited here, except where unavailable, i.e., for
Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, In
duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, Super Librum de causis expositio, and In librum Beati Dionysii De diviinis nominibus expositio (see the reference list for those editions). All
translations from Latin are my own. Abbreviations of commonly cited works: ST = Summa
theologiae; SCG = Summa contra gentiles; In Sent. = Commentary on the Sentences; DV = Quaestiones disputatae de veritate; CT = Compendium theologiae; DSS = De substantiis separatis; QDDA
= Quaestiones disputatae de anima.
3
For an example in print, see Péghaire, Intellectus et ratio, 31–71 and 85–102. The difference
is due to the “weakness” of our intellectual light, compared to the “fullness” of the angelic
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reading of Aquinas, embodied and non-embodied intellects are engaging
in the same activity φ-ing, differing only in their “skill level”: Embodied intellects are deficient φ-ers while non-embodied intellects are skilled φ-ers,
in the manner of an apprentice and a master silversmith crafting the same
kind of vase, one with many slow, imperfect movements and the other
with fewer, more accurate movements.4
But this narrative has persistently glossed over a more substantive and
illuminating difference between embodied and non-embodied knowing.
This study aims to show that for Aquinas, embodied and non-embodied
knowing are different kinds or modes of cognition altogether—like φ-ing
and ψ-ing—because the distinctive causal genealogy of embodied vs.
non-embodied intellectual acts results in experiences that have fundamentally
different structures. For medieval thinkers, universals come in different
kinds, and embodied vs. non-embodied knowing are the different modes
of cognition that correspond to different kinds of universal. As a result,
the activity of an embodied intellect is fundamentally incomplete without
the concurrent activity of imagination—which sheds new light on why
Aquinas describes embodied knowing as a mode of knowing “by turning
to phantasms.”
As I will show, then, that although embodied and non-embodied
knowing do have certain features in common that warrant their both being
called “intellective” at some generic level of abstraction, we should think
of them as different kinds of knowing, in the manner that knowing in
general is different from, e.g., hearing or seeing.5 Or to put it in the closest
contemporary terms (merely as a useful heuristic and without suggesting
intellectual light. ST I 58.3 is typical; see also I 55.2c, I 58.4–5. The process is described extensively in Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance,” 185–193; Péghaire, Intellectus et
ratio also remains a useful treatment. Another difference that Aquinas sometimes mentions
also seems to indicate the defectiveness of embodied cognition: namely, our intellects are intermittently active, whereas angels are always actually understanding. The reason is that the
human intellect is by nature a potency for intelligible form and must therefore be activated,
whereas “in angels there is no potency bare of act,” because angels are innately formed by
all the intelligible likenesses of natural beings; see ST I 53.1 ad 3; see also I 55.2, I 54.4, I 58.1,
and I 84.3 ad 1.
4
For this reason, Bazán has recently criticized Aquinas for tending “to undervalue
human nature by unfairly comparing it to hypothetical superior realities,” and proposed
that scholars should avoid these comparisons (“On Angels,” 80). But recent research has
shown quite the opposite, i.e., that the full scope of medieval philosophical thought requires scholars to engage with medieval angelology, where crucial thought-experiments for
medieval philosophy of mind take place. See Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage; Perler,
“Thought Experiments,” 143–153, as well as the other essays in the same volume; and the
essays in Hoffmann, Companion to Angels.
5
Aquinas has distinctive ways of dividing genus-species relationships which affect the
analysis here. For the precise way in which angelic intellection and human intellection fall
into a common genus, see Cory, “Is Anything in the Intellect That Was Not First in Sense?,”
126–136. Note that I am not denying that Aquinas differentiates human knowers from angels
in terms of the quantitative “scope of a single act” criterion. My point is just that this criterion
is the one that he uses more broadly to set up a hierarchy of perfection among intellectual
entities (differentiating not only human knowers from angels, but one angel from another),
and does not constitute the fundamental difference between embodied and non-embodied
knowing.
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that Aquinas subscribes to the underlying framework): These are not instances of the same kind of mental state with different contents. Rather,
they are two different kinds of mental states altogether. Certainly I am not
denying that embodied knowing ranks as a less perfect kind of intellectual
activity for Aquinas. Aquinas’s ontology allows for a ranking of perfection
among kinds, so that, e.g., horses are a more perfect kind of animal than
oysters. My contentions here are just that although our knowing is an immaterial act, it has a distinctively embodied mode, and that the embodied
mode of knowing is distinguished by the kind of universal it grasps. From
that distinctive character it follows that embodied knowing is a less perfect mode of knowing than other modes. (Similarly, there is something
distinctive of horseness and something distinctive of oysterness, from
which follow their different positions on the scale of animal perfection.)
This study, then, is mainly concerned with Aquinas’s answer to the first
puzzle mentioned above: Whether our embodiment leaves a distinctive
mark on all our cognitive experience, including any immaterial cognitive
activities, or whether our immaterial activities could just as well occur
in a non-embodied mind. In the first two sections, I will explore Aquinas’s theory of multiple kinds of universal, and show why different kinds
of universal are grasped by different kinds of mind. The third section
appeals to the unique features of abstracted universals to explain why embodied knowing necessarily “turns to phantasms” (and what such turning
means). The fourth section sketches the contribution that embodiment
makes in “what is it like” for us to know.
But in the course of the investigation, we will also get some clues as
to Aquinas’s position vis-à-vis the second puzzle, i.e., whether non-embodied (angelic) minds can have anything like our experience of hearing
music or feeling the warmth of a fire. And so the fifth section considers
this issue briefly. Note that throughout, by “knowing,” I mean “knowing
extramental realities,” since self-knowing or knowing God introduce further complications that unnecessarily muddy the waters.
1. The Origin of the Species? Creative, Emanated, and Abstracted
In order to cognize anything, a cognitive power must be “formed” in the
right way: Aquinas calls the forms of sense and intellect “species,” and the
forms of imagination “phantasms.” Now one of the founding principles of
Aquinas’s cognition theory is that cognition requires likeness. In order to
cognize x, the cognitive power’s form must be a likeness of x: An intellect
must become treeish—acquire a treeish form, i.e., the intelligible species
“tree”—in order to cognize trees.6
Now the notion of “likeness” operative here is not a narrow psychological notion of representation, but a broader metaphysical notion rooted in
Aquinas’s broader theory of causation, according to which “every agent

E.g., ST I 12.2; DV 1.1.

6
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makes something like itself” (omne agens agit sibi simile).7 Agents have the
active powers they have in virtue of what they are, and their actions are
the expressions of their being: An agent can only give what it has, and
conversely, there is no likeness without a causal history to back it up.
What agents do is induce in the patient a form like their own. In some
cases, as when hot water heats spaghetti, the form induced in the patient
is of the same kind as the agent’s form (physical heat). But forms can be
alike without being of the same kind: Aquinas distinguishes between a
fire igniting a tree (making the wood take on the same kind of form as the
agent’s), vs. a fire heating iron until it is red hot (making the iron merely
“fiery”).8 Similarly, the intellect can be immaterially horsified without becoming a real material horse, and God’s creatures reflect the divine essence
without being themselves divine.9 (Note that technically, “likeness” or similitudo describes the relation of one form to another form,10 but Aquinas
more loosely transfers the name “likeness” to the forms themselves that
are in the likeness relation; it is in that sense that he calls the intelligible
species a “likeness” of extramental natures.)
So in claiming that cognition requires the likeness of cognizer and
cognized, Aquinas is committed to the view that cognition requires some
sort of causal story that accounts for the relevant likeness. The causal relationship is normally direct, and might go either way. On the one hand,
the object might be the cause that makes the cognizer like itself (e.g., very
roughly, a horse horsifies my intellect, enabling me to know what a horse
is). In that case, the cognizer is like the object. On the other hand, the cognizer might be the cause that makes the object like itself (e.g., very roughly,
Frank Lloyd Wright has a house-idea which he expresses as Fallingwater).
In that case, the object is like the cognizer. Either way, likeness in one direction or the other is necessary for cognition.11 (This schematic poses special
problems for angelic knowing, as we’ll see in a moment.)
As a result, for Aquinas, the causal history of a given case of cognitive
likeness is extremely important. In a localized way, the causes that make us
intellectually “like” themselves constrain our intellectual activity: My intellect cannot be treeish (enabling me to know trees directly) if no tree has
ever acted on my cognitive powers. But as we will see, Aquinas goes a step
further to hold that different kinds of knower-known causal relationships

7
See, e.g., In Metaph. VII 8, where Aquinas also accommodates the obvious exceptions
to this principle by noting that it applies only to primary, per se causation (and not, e.g., to
instrumental causes or causes related to their effect only accidentally).

Compendium theologiae I 68.

8

In IV Sent. d.44 3.1 ad qc.3, ad 2; SCG I 29; ST I 4.3 ad 4.

9

In Metaph. V 17.

10

ST I 14.5–8, I 15.1–3, I 44.4 ad 2; In II Sent. d.3 3.1 ad 2, DV 2.3; SCG IV 11. Note that objects can also be known indirectly when their effects act directly on the cognizer. The intellect,
thus assimilated to the effect, can then reason to the cause, as when I surmise a predator’s
presence when observing the agitation of a flock of birds.
11
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result not only in differences in what is included in the act of knowing, but
also in how that knowing is internally structured, so to speak.
For what follows, it will be important to understand how these principles are applied in specific cases. So let us briefly spell out how the theory
works for the three kinds of intellectual knowing that Aquinas identifies:
our embodied knowing, angels’ non-embodied knowing, and God’s
non-embodied knowing.
In the case of embodied knowing, intellectual likeness is caused by a
physical object assimilating the intellect to itself. An apple’s color, texture, and smell affect our physical, living sense-organs, causing sensory
likenesses that in turn affect the internal senses, culminating in a refined
internal likeness, called a “phantasm,” of a particular apple in the imagination. Now the phantasm is a bodily form (of the brain) and hence
cannot act on the immaterial intellect by itself. It receives a boost in causal
power, however, from the soul’s immaterial intellectual light (the agent
intellect), so as to cause an immaterial likeness of itself, universal ‘apple,’
in the possible intellect. Aquinas calls this causation of immaterial likeness
“abstraction,” and he calls the intellect’s resulting abstracted likeness to
“apple” an “intelligible species.” This abstracted intelligible form makes
the embodied intellect be like “apple” in a universal way, without indexing
to any particular apple. (The reason for this departicularization, as I’ve
argued extensively elsewhere, is not that the intellect actively separates
common features from particular features, as is typical for abstractionist
theories; rather, the loss of particularization is rather an incidental effect
of the causal process whereby material things cause immaterial likenesses
in intellects.)12
Because physical entities can act only on other physical entities, the
mediation of the external and internal corporeal senses is essential to abstractive cognition. And thus only an embodied intellect can cognize by
abstractive likeness:
Abstractive likeness: Int knows x by abstractive likeness if and only
the form whereby Int knows x is caused by x acting through sense and
imagination (through the power of the agent intellect).
Since only a material thing can act on sense, evidently only a material
thing can cause an abstractive likeness. An abstracted species’ “direction
of causal dependence” thus faces toward the physical world, orienting
the embodied intellect toward phantasms and ultimately toward physical
individuals—and it properly tends toward a certain mode of use, as will
become clear in §3 in discussing Aquinas’s “turn to phantasms.”
With respect to non-embodied intellects, however, a difficulty arises.
According to Aquinas’s general theory of causation, entities on a “lower

12
This paragraph summarizes the interpretation of abstraction defended in Cory, “Rethinking Abstractionism.”
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rung” of the ladder of being cannot act on entities on a “higher rung.”13
The reason is that in moving up the ladder of being, a thing’s agency becomes more powerful, and its potential to be affected decreases. At any
given level, the degree of agency and potency are coordinated such that
entities on the same level can affect each other “horizontally.” Hence
acting “downwards” is unproblematic: The agent is more powerful, and
the patient more susceptible, than is strictly necessary. Conversely, acting
“upwards” (including physical bodies acting on immaterial intellectual
powers) is impossible: The lower agent is not powerful enough relative
to the lesser susceptibility of the patient. For embodied minds, the difficulty is overcome precisely by embodiment and the causal power of
the agent intellect: Human bodies are susceptible to the agency of other
bodies, allowing apples to act on us in the first place; from there, sense
and imagination serve as refining intermediaries that make the received
physical apple-form apt to be abstracted by the immaterial agent intellect.
But angels and God lack any apparatus for being affected by an apple,
so apples cannot cause either God’s or angels’ thoughts about apples.14
Moreover, for Aquinas, angelic intellects are arrayed along a scale of increasing intellectual agency in such a way that there is only one angel at
each “level.” So it is also impossible for lower angelic intellects to induce
intelligible likenesses in higher angelic intellects.15 And since God is pure
actuality, nothing at all can act on God’s intellect.
Nevertheless, Aquinas follows a long tradition of Greek and Arabic
thought according to which non-embodied minds must know what is
below them: It is unacceptable to construe minds as increasingly ignorant of reality the more powerful they are. So he needs a different way
of establishing knower-known likeness, in order to allow for “knowing
downwards.” For Aquinas, the problem is, in a way, easier to solve with
respect to God than angels, because God has a causal relationship with
everything that is lower than himself. So (since every agent makes its patient like itself), all creatures are like God, and this likeness is sufficient for
God to know creatures without being causally affected by them.16 In other
13
ST I 79.5 ad 1; I 84.6c and ad 2; SCG I 65, III 84. For puzzles about human and angelic
cognition generated by this principle, see ST I 84.6.
14

See ST I 55.2 ad 2.

ST I 106.3 (and see I 106.1 on what it means for one angel to enlighten another). The
situation with inter-angelic knowledge is somewhat more complicated than this summary
might suggest. Aquinas admits in I 56.2 that since angels all belong to the same intellectual
genus, any angel can know any other “by its essence,” i.e., by the natural likeness that one
angel has to the other (though it is unclear whether Aquinas thinks this would be sufficient
for being acquainted with the other angel as an individual). Aquinas also allows that any
angel can disclose its thoughts to any other other regardless of hierarchical order, but since
this angelic “speech” merely removes the obstacle to knowledge and apparently does not
involve any causal action of the “speaker” on the “listener’s” intellect (I 107.1, ad 1; 107.2), it
does not violate the principle that the lower cannot act on the higher.
15

16
See ST I 14–15; and In I Sent. d.36; DV 2.1–5 and 3.1–3; SCG I 45–55, with discussion in
Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas; Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas. On the divine
likeness in creation, see ST I 93.
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words, the likeness whereby God knows creatures is of the second kind
mentioned above, caused by the knower who brings into existence objects
like himself or herself. In these cases, the form whereby Int causes and
thereby knows x is called an “exemplar.” So let us call this kind of likeness
“exemplar likeness”:
Exemplar likeness: Int knows x by exemplar likeness if and only the
form whereby Int knows x is the form whereby Int brings x into existence.
For Aquinas, God’s idea of x is an exemplar of x only if it is actually used
to bring x into existence. God does not create everything that he could
create but knows the full extent of his power to create. Thus for Aquinas,
some of God’s ideas—those of non-created possibles—are not properly
“exemplars.”17
Aquinas draws an analogy between God’s exemplar knowledge of creatures and the human artist’s exemplar knowledge of his own products.
For instance, inasmuch as Fallingwater is the realization of Frank Lloyd
Wright’s architectural idea, Wright can enjoy practical knowledge of Fallingwater even in the absence of any corresponding sensory experience,
without visiting the site at all. Still, there is an important difference between God’s exemplar knowledge and human practical knowledge. God’s
exemplar knowledge extends to individuals in their concrete existence,
whereas Wright’s practical knowledge of Fallingwater does not (what
exactly this means, we shall see in § 2). Moreover, human artistic ideas
are themselves the result of recombining and rearranging images and abstracted species acquired through sensory experience. Thus although our
ideas, like God’s, can be patterns for new artificial forms, human exemplar
knowledge operates within a broader framework of abstractive likeness,
dependent on sensory experience.
It is important to keep in mind that because likeness tracks causal
dependence, exemplar likeness runs in the opposite “direction” from abstractive likeness. Although Aquinas allows that in our ordinary speech
we frequently speak of God’s Ideas as “likenesses” of creatures, strictly
speaking it is creatures who are “like” the divine essence. Creatures are
the realizations of the “divine Ideas”—which are nothing other than the
divine essence itself, considered in different ways as the exemplar that
different creatures are like. And thus God knows all creatures not insofar
as he is like them, but insofar as they are like him, existing as likenesses of
himself, which he causes.18
This direction of likeness does not affect the occurrence of knowing: As
long as knower and known have some relationship of likeness in either

See ST I 15.3. On exemplar causation, see Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 1–43.

17

See SCG I 29. Despite this technical precision, Aquinas elsewhere does not hesitate to
describe the divine essence imprecisely as the “likeness of” creatures, e.g., ST I 15.2 ad 1.
18
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direction, knowing can occur. But as we’ll see shortly, the direction of likeness does matter a great deal to the way the resulting knowing is structured.
In any case, the notion of exemplar likeness is of no help to angels, i.e.,
non-embodied created intellects. Aquinas breaks with many of his ancient
sources in denying that angels are creators or even intermediaries of God’s
creative act.19 So how can angels know what is below them, if they are
neither acted upon by what is below them (so, no abstractive likeness),
nor produce what is below them (so, no exemplar likeness)? Aquinas
gets around these constraints by attributing to angels a derivative kind
of likeness: God causes in them intelligible species that are like his own
exemplar knowledge of the entire existing created order:
There is in God the likeness of all things both with respect to form and with
respect to matter, insofar as there preexists in him as in the cause everything
that is found in things. And for the same reason the species of angelic intellects, which are certain derivative likenesses from the divine essence, are
the likenesses of things not only with respect to form but also with respect
to matter.20

Although Aquinas describes species as “flowing”21 into or “impressed”
on the angelic intellect,22 he is not suggesting that God bestows them as a
supernatural gift on angelic intellects that would otherwise know nothing
but themselves. Rather, for Aquinas, it belongs to the nature of a created
non-embodied intellect to reflect the divine Ideas in “intelligible being,” parallel to creatures’ reflecting the divine Ideas in their “natural being.”23 Indeed,
Aquinas meticulously distinguishes this natural knowledge from angels’
supernatural knowledge of created beings in the beatific vision.24
So we could perhaps think of non-embodied intellects precisely as the
created images, in the order of being, of the divine intellect qua creative
principle. As such, their nature requires that their intellects be innately
formed with the likenesses of the divine Ideas, i.e., the exemplars whereby
God creates and knows whatever he creates.25
In short, then, the angelic intellect’s likeness to other creatures is caused
neither by the other creature itself, nor by the knower—but by the divine
intellect. We can call this exemplar-like likeness.26
As he tells us in DV 8.8.
ST I 57.2 ad 2. See also I 55.2 ad 1; I 56.2; I 89.4; QDDA 20 ad 8; and In II Sent. d.3 3.3.
Often Aquinas merely says that angelic species are had by participating in God the Creator
(ST I 57.2 ad 2; Super Librum De causis 10; DSS 14; SCG II 100). On angelic cognition see Goris,
“Angelic Knowledge,” 149–186; Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage, 17–76.
21
Effluxum (ST I 55.2 and 56.2; QDDA 20).
22
Impressa, indita (ST I 56.2; indita is also applied to natural inclinations, I 60.1 ad 2 and 3).
23
ST I 56.2c; ST I 56.3c; ST I 55.2; SCG II 46; QDDA 18 and 20. “L’ange est aussi le miroir
intelligible de l’ensemble de l’univers créé” (Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage, 166).
24
See, e.g., ST I 57.5.
25
ST I 57.2c and ad 3; SCG II 100; DV 8.8 and 8.14 ad 11.
26
See DV 8.8 ad 1.
19
20
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Exemplar-like likeness: Int knows x by a exemplar-like likeness if and
only if the form whereby Int knows x is caused by the form that is x’s
exemplar likeness.
We can call the intelligible forms or species whereby angels know, caused
as imprints of God’s own knowledge, “exemplar-like species.” These
species, Aquinas explains, conform an angelic intellect to all other creatures—not only to physical creatures, but also other angels.27 Moreover,
just as God’s exemplar likeness only includes what he actually creates, not
the infinity of possibles that he could create, so too the second-hand exemplar likeness in angels is a likeness only to what actually exists.28
It is worth emphasizing that exemplar-like likenesses have a peculiar
status: not only are they “likenesses of [created] things,” but they are also
(as one might expect given Aquinas’s theory of causation) “participated
likenesses of the divine essence”29 and “exceedingly like the ideal reasons
existing in the divine mind.”30 While one might at first suppose that a
likeness of a divine Idea would have to be dramatically different from a
likeness of an apple, on Aquinas’s view the two roles are not actually in
competition. Some angel’s exemplar-like species is like apples in virtue of
being like the divine Idea “Apple,” of which apples are the likeness. Aquinas
puts it even more precisely: What angels have is “a likeness of the whole
thing inasmuch as it is brought forth by God in an exemplary way.”31 So it
is not just the case that exemplar-like species “apple” and physical apples
are like each other because they are each like some common cause (in the
manner of two daughters who look like each other to the extent to which
they each resemble their mother). Rather, by exemplar-like species, angels
are assimilated to apples under a certain aspect, i.e., they grasp apples precisely as expressions of a preeminent Idea “Apple.” (Similarly, one might
27
ST I 56.2, and see note 15 above. Interestingly, Aquinas hold that an angel’s innate
exemplar-like species assimilate it to all existing creatures, which would seem to include
also angels higher than itself. So although there is no principled reason preventing a higher
angel from causing its likeness in the lower angel, it seems that this causation would be
superfluous for securing the lower angel’s acquaintance with the higher angel. Nevertheless,
Aquinas suggests that higher angels do act on lower angels—but not to acquaint the lower
angels with themselves, but rather to educate the lower angel concerning what the higher
angel sees in a more comprehensive and unified way (ST I 106.1–4).
28
Angelic species are likenessess of the “factive forms” (creative likenesses or exemplars)
in God (see DV 8.8 and 8.11), and hence know only the “things” (i.e., existing things; see DV
8.12). God alone can know all the possibles that are in his power (ST I 14.5, 9, 12). Angelic
species thus apparently track perfectly the state of the created universe as it changes (see DV
8.15 ad 4; ST I 56.2 ad 4).
29
ST I 89.4. The Latin here has participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, and I think
there should be no hesitation in reading the genitive as modifying similitudines, not participatae. When Aquinas wants to describe A as that in which B participates, he uses adverbs
(“participates from / in A,” de, ab, ex, in) or the accusative (participates A), never the genitive.
In contrast, the genitive is a perfectly normal way of identifying A as that “of which” B is a
likeness.
30
In II Sent. d.3 3.3; see also DV 8.8 and SCG II 100.
31
In II Sent. d. 3. 3.3 ad 1; see also In II Sent. d.3 3.1 ad 2; DV 8.11.
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approach Homer’s Iliad as translated into English by Alexander Pope.) We
will see in the next section why this is important.
2. Different Species, Different Universals
This distinction between abstracted species and exemplar-like species is,
I contend, central to Aquinas’s account of what is distinctive of embodied
knowing, as opposed to non-embodied knowing. According to Aquinas,
actions are distinguished in kind according to the kind of form that enables the agent to produce such an action. So the act of understanding
performed in virtue of an abstracted species is different in kind from the act
performed in virtue of an exemplar-like species.32 But one might suppose
that this difference in kind cannot really be very significant. After all, the
difference between the two kinds of intelligible species is simply grounded
in the direction of the causal act that produces the likeness that makes
knowing possible. In one case, the likeness is caused in the knower by
physical objects; in the other, it is caused in physical things by the knower
(the Creator). As long as the intellect and object are ultimately united by a
likeness relation, why should the cause of that likeness matter?
The reason, fundamentally, is that for Aquinas, the cause of an intelligible likeness affects what the intellect is able to understand in virtue
of that likeness.33 Now as readers of Aquinas are aware, he identifies an
important difference between embodied human knowing and angelic or
Divine knowing: namely, non-embodied intellects are able to grasp material particulars, whereas our embodied intellects cannot (we can only
imagine particulars, but not apprehend them intellectually). Aquinas explains that the degree and extent of any effect’s likeness to its cause varies
in accord with the efficacy of a cause’s power to assimilate an effect to
itself. When a material object (e.g., Fido) causes its likeness “dog” in my
intellect through the phantasm “Fido” acting in the power of the agent
intellect, something is lost in translation: The phantasm’s restriction to
representing “this dog Fido” fails to be communicated to the abstracted
species “dog” in the process. The resulting abstracted species is the likeness only of what Fido is, not of Fido in his particularity as this, existing
here and now. So an abstracted species can only be a likeness to the essences
of material particulars, never to those particulars qua particular.34 (This is
why the embodied mode of knowing is, for Aquinas, an objectively less
32
QDDA 7 ad 1; In IV Sent. d.50 1.2 ad 4. This claim seems to conflict with ST I 89.6 ad
2, which argues that embodied and disembodied souls use abstracted species in different
ways, because “diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa virtute specierum, sed
ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.” But there Aquinas is not denying that kinds of species
differentiate kinds of intellection. The point is merely that although the abstracted species
naturally provokes a certain kind of intellection (“by turning to phantasms”—see §2 below),
nonetheless when disembodiment prevents the conditions for such intellection from being
met, the soul can still use abstracted species in a truncated way.
33
See especially SCG I 65.
34
ST I 86.1; but note ad 3, emphasizing that the intellect is not in itself incapable of
grasping singulars. Rather, the obstacle for us is that physical singulars cannot be grasped
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perfect kind of knowing than a non-embodied mode, although this lesser
degree of perfection is not what most fundamentally defines embodied
knowing as a distinct kind of knowing.)
In contrast, God causes a creature in its entirety—form, matter, and existence—and continues to conserve the creature in being at every moment
of its existence. Hence the creature’s likeness to the divine intellect goes
“all the way down,” so to speak, to the creature’s metaphysical foundation.
Thus God’s exemplar knowledge extends not only to dog-nature, but to
Fido and Spot in all their concrete existing-here-and-now singularity. And
the same, therefore, is true of non-embodied intellects’ exemplar-like species. Hence God’s knowledge by exemplar likeness (and therefore angels’
knowledge by exemplar-like likeness) goes farther than human artists’
exemplar knowledge of their artistic products. Frank Lloyd Wright’s exemplar knowledge of Fallingwater causes, and hence extends to, merely
the artificial form of Fallingwater, and not the matter that constitutes Fallingwater as this here and now. So if Wright were to know Fallingwater by
practical knowledge from his sickbed, without ever going to see the structure, he would know it merely as “a house of a certain type.” In contrast,
God and angels grasp Fallingwater as it is in itself, existing here and now,
with the same immediacy and presence that characterizes our sensory
experience of Fallingwater.35
From this distinction, it is tempting to conclude that the difference between knowing by abstracted species vs. exemplar-like species is simply a
matter of a quantative difference in the “scope” of each kind of species. As
it seems, abstracted species extend to dog-nature, whereas exemplar-like
species extend to dog-nature plus the individuating features of individual
dogs. Aquinas even seems to suggest as much when he says: “Angels cognize singulars by universal forms, which are, nevertheless, likenesses of
things both with respect to universal principles and principles of individuation.”36
But such remarks create a misleading impression. In reality, I contend,
Aquinas’s exemplar-like species are not more comprehensive than abstracted species in some merely additive sense. Rather, we ought to think
of the difference between these two kinds of species in terms of apprehending different kinds of universals. (There is no room here to explore the
relationship between the universal that is understood and the intelligible
species.37 By “apprehending a universal” I simply mean to refer to a certain kind of cognitive experience without asserting anything about its
structure or about the ontology of universals.) Throughout his writings,
through abstracted species. On the “lossy” character of abstractive likeness, see Cory, “Rethinking Abstractionism,” 623–627.
35
As summarized succinctly in ST I 14.11.
36
For this additive interpretation, see Péghaire, Intellectus et ratio, 55–52; Goris, “Angelic
Knowledge,” 160.
37
See De ente et essentia 2.

Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas

429

Aquinas associates abstracted and exemplar-like species with different
kinds of universals, in line with a widespread medieval notion of the
“threefold universal.”38 His clearest statement on this point appears in the
early commentary on the Sentences, though the distinction appears also in
the Summa theologiae:
What is universal is threefold: There is a certain [universal] in the thing,
namely, its nature, which exists in particulars, although it is not in them
with respect to actual universality. There is also a certain universal which
is received from the thing (a re) by abstraction, and this is posterior to the
thing; and the forms of angels are not universals in that sense. In addition,
there is a certain universal that is [directed] toward the thing (ad rem), and
which is prior to the thing itself, like the form of a house in the mind of the
builder; and in this way there are universal forms of things existing in the
angelic mind—not as though they themselves were operative, but that they
are like operative [forms], as when someone has an operative knowledge
[only] theoretically.39

“Universal” in the first sense refers to something in actual dogs, i.e., the
nature or essence that constitutes this individual as a dog rather than
anything else, and which is a real metaphysical part of Fido. Note that
properly speaking, for Aquinas, universality (unity with respect to many)
is a property of conceptual reality—which is why he adds that the nature
in dogs is only a potential universal.40
But our business here is with the second and third senses of “universal,”
and it is significant for our purposes that Aquinas distinguishes them as
different kinds of universals. The “universal” in the second sense—i.e., the
universal “posterior to the particular” and “received from abstraction”—
is what is grasped by means of an abstracted intelligible species: namely,
the essence “dog” conceived without restriction to that particular.41 Let us call
this an “abstracted universal.”
The “universal” in the third sense—the universal “prior to the particular”—is what is known by angels through their exemplar-like species:
namely, “Dog” as a preeminent causal principle that all individual dogs imitate.
Let us call the latter an “exemplar universal.”42
38
Nani-Suarez thus is right to map the difference between angelic and human intelligible
species onto different universals: “Cette universalité [des espèces angéliques] n’a peu ou
rien à voir avec le concept universel de l’objet que la connaissance humaine abstrait du sensible” (Connaissance et langage, 33n3); but her account of the difference, in terms of “totality,”
“purity,” “clarity,” and “transparence,” does not escape the impression of mere quantitative
difference (Connaissance et langage, 30–33). For the medieval doctrine of the “threefold universal,” see Alain De Libera, Métaphysique et noétique, 211–264.
39
In II Sent. d.3 3.2 ad 1; compare ST I 55.3 ad 1; I 85.3 ad 1.
40
The common nature that all dogs share exists in each dog as fully individuated (De ente
et essentia 2; In I Sent. d.19 5.1), so he sometimes calls it a potential ‘universal’ (QDDA 3 ad 7).
41
ST I 85.1 ad 1.
42
Contra Nani-Suarez (Connaissance et langage, 30), it seems to me that the general notion
of the universale ad rem in Aquinas encompasses both the divine Ideas and to angelic species,
just as it does in Albertus Magnus (De Libera, La querelle, 245–262).

430

Faith and Philosophy

“Knowing the exemplar universal ‘Dog’” refers to the cognitive experience that an angel has when it exercises the exemplar-like species that
is a likeness of the divine Idea “Dog” (or one of the possible cognitive experiences facilitated by that species—an angel also uses the same species
to consider just Fido as an expression of the exemplar universal “Dog,”
as we’ll see in a moment). I should note that caution is warranted here,
since one might think that in knowing the exemplar universal “Dog,” the
angel is simply cognizing the divine Idea “Dog.” Indeed, normally, for
Aquinas, to cognize A by a likeness directly caused by A would be to cognize A directly, in a manner analogous to sensory vision. And recall that
exemplar-like species are likenesses of creaturely realities only in virtue of
being likenesses of the divine Ideas. But cognition of God is a special case,
since no created likeness to God (including exemplar-like species) can adequately assimilate the creature to the divine essence. So even though the
angel’s exemplar-like species are directly caused by God’s exemplar Ideas,
these species cannot enable the angel to “see” the divine essence (or the
Ideas, which are identical to the divine essence).43 What angels grasp by
their innate species, then, is something that is like a divine Idea; or to put
it another way, their experience of “Dog” is a lesser participation in the
divine Idea “Dog” itself, which falls short of direct vision.44
So what does Aquinas mean when he says that abstracted and exemplar
universals—that which is understood by intellects formed, respectively,
by abstracted vs. exemplar-like species—are different kinds of universals? It
is hard to articulate the difference between them, due (Aquinas might say)
to our lack of experience with exemplar universals, which we understand
only by comparison to the abstracted universals with which we are familiar. And the temptation is to distinguish them into quantitatively more
43
On how angels know God naturally, see ST I 56.3. Note that in ST I 58.6–7, he distinguishes the kind of natural knowledge of creatures under consideration here (which he calls
“evening knowledge) from a supernatural, beatific knowledge of creatures “by the rationes
of things existing in the Word” (“morning knowledge”); I am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for encouraging me to consider this distinction. In the ST texts, Aquinas describes
the angels’ “morning knowledge” of apples as the knowledge of apples that angels have
through beholding the divine essence as causal principle of apples. (The difference between
morning and evening knowledge is put somewhat differently in the earlier In II Sent. d.12
1.3 and DV 8.16–17.)
44
I am not suggesting that all natural angelic knowing is a thinking about God, but rather,
that natural angelic knowing is precisely the sort of cognitive experience that an intellect has
when it is assimilated to God by creaturely forms proportionate to its own nature. Consider
Aquinas’s remarks about how angels know God through their natural powers (ST I 56.3). By
their own natural powers, he says, angels cognize God by a likeness, i.e., the likeness their
own nature bears to him. So in knowing God through their own likeness to him, angels do
not “see” the divine essence. But neither is their knowing wholly indirect, in the manner of
a viewer who sees something reflected in some third-party entity such as a mirror. An angel’s
natural knowledge of God is therefore structured in a vision-like way, but is not properly
a “seeing” of the divine essence. What Aquinas is describing here is, perhaps, a kind of
cognition that falls short of direct vision, but which remains experiential in some sense. One
could, I think, plausibly apply the same line of analysis to the situation at hand: namely,
when an angel grasps the exemplar universal “Dog,” this is not a direct vision of the divine
Idea “Dog,” but a lesser, darkened creaturely approximation of the divine Idea “Dog.”
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complete and less complete versions of something univocally universal.
But instead, I suggest, we should regard the difference between them as
a difference between two kinds of one-to-many relationships, or two modes of
universality.
In other words, my contention is that the crucial distinction here is not
merely quantitative, as though an abstracted universal would only include generic “dog” while an exemplar universal would include “dog” +
“Fido” + “Spot,” etc. Rather, the difference has to do with the internal
structure of the universal—and hence what it means to be a universal, a
one-to-many—in the first place. Abstracted vs. exemplar universals relate
to the relevant particulars as one-to-many in different ways. An abstracted
universal is one-to-many in the sense of being indeterminate with respect
to, or in potency to, many determinate entities: It is indifferently applicable
to a set of particulars. “Dog” as abstracted universal—what we grasp by
means of an abstracted species—is the nature that exists in a dog, understood as indifferent to this or that particular dog.45 Universality, for the
abstracted universal, is therefore a logical property of the conceptualization of common natures that really exist determinately in this or that
individual.
Or to put it another way: The intelligible species “dog” represents universally “insofar as it is the likeness of all and leads to the cognition of all
insofar as they are [dogs],” applying a uniform account “to all individuals
outside the soul” that have this metaphysical part or essence.46 In contrast,
“Dog” as exemplar universal, i.e., what is conceived through an exemplar-like species, is a “one” that is the cause of being—the entire being—of
many.47 Exemplar “Dog” is the intensive perfection of dogness, which causes
each individual dog as its likeness, and whose being and causal power cannot be
adequately expressed by any individual dogs or even by all of them taken together.
Indeed, as it is in itself (a divine Idea), exemplar “Dog” just is the divine
essence, “the perfect likeness of all things,” considered as imitated by existing dogs48—or speaking more properly, they are like it. Considered in
this light, exemplar “Dog” is like a Platonic Form (as Aquinas explicitly
ST I 85.2 ad 2.
De ente et essentia 2; and In I Sent. d.23 1.1, which similarly emphasizes that names for essences refer to something of the individual: either “humanity” referring to a part of Socrates
and prescinding from individuality, or “human being” referring to the whole of Socrates but
without determination to Socrates. Again, in In De divinis nominibus 5.1, Aquinas says that in
species and genera such as “man” and “animal,” “comprehenduntur universalia principia in
actu, singularia autem in potentia: homo enim dicitur qui habet humanitatem, absque praecisione individualium principiorum.” Universals of this sort are “less determinate” (minus
determinata, In Post. An. 2.16, n. 6) or “in some way contracted,” i.e., bound to what is less
than the singular (quodammodo contractae, De subst. sep. 16). For us to know universally is to
know generically, remaining in potency to what is more specific (ST I 85.3, where he traces
this potency to the fact that our intellectual knowledge originates in the senses, and that our
intellect “proceeds from potency to act”; see also In Physicorum I 1 and In Physicorum VII 6; In
Meteorologicorum I 1.1; In Posteriorum analyticorum I 38, n. 7).
47
See DV 2.3 ad 8.
48
ST I 84.2 ad 3; I 15.1 ad 3.
45
46
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states49), serving as the cause of all dogs as its likenesses in “natural being,”
as well as the cause of exemplar-like intelligible species in non-embodied
intellects as its likenesses “in intelligible being.”50 So angels, whose intellects are naturally formed by exemplar-like species, understand individual
dogs precisely as the likenesses of this preeminent cause “Dog.”
The exemplar universal “Dog” that angels grasp by exemplar-like
species, then, is not a generic concept that applies indifferently to particulars. It represents neither dog-nature as a metaphysical part of a dog,
nor dogness-plus-the-individuating-characteristics-of-all-dogs, nor the
set of all dogs. Rather, what angels grasp is the “perfection” of dogness
existing more eminently (eminentius) or more truly (verius) or more excellently (secundum modum excellentem) than it does in dogs.51 Or to put
it another way, the angelic concept of universal “Dog” is a concept of
Dog-as-preeminent-standard, or Dog as the total cause of all dogs in their
individual existence. Consequently, this sort of universal “Dog” does not
abstract from, but preeminently includes, the concrete singular reality of
every real individual dog that imitates it. There is no reality in Fido that is
not more eminently in “Dog” as its cause. Thus for Aquinas, it is precisely
because angels are assimilated to the exemplar universal “Dog,” which
unifies the perfection of every real dog, that angels apprehend individual
dogs “as they subsist in their own natures” individually and materially:
Things are in angelic cognition in just the same way as they flow from God
so that they subsist in their own natures. For it is clear that from God, there
flows into things not only that which pertains to the universal nature, but
also the principles of individuation, and therefore he is the cause of the
whole substance of the thing, both respect to its matter and its form. And
according to his causing, so too he knows, for his knowledge is the cause of
the thing as was said above. Therefore just as God is the likeness of all things
by his essence, whereby he causes all things, and by [his essence] he causes
everything not only with respect to universal natures but also with respect
to their singularity, so too by the species impressed in them by God, angels
cognize things not only according to their universal nature but also according to their singularity, insofar as [those species] are certain multiplied representations of that unified and simple essence.52

49
ST I 84.5; SCG I 54. Elsewhere Aquinas rejects the Platonic doctrine of Forms, but only
when taking Forms as creative principles distinct from God, e.g., Proclus’s “gods” (SCG I
51–52, Super Librum de causis 10 and DSS 14).
50
As Doolan points out, Aquinas holds that Fido’s causal principle is God’s Idea of the
individual, “Fido”; and Doolan further concludes, on the basis of ST I 15.3 ad 4, that Fido’s
causal principle is not some more general Idea “Dog” (Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 124–133).
Nevertheless, I would suggest that Aquinas’s remarks in that text could equally be taken as
implying that the Idea “Dog,” qua causal principle of Fido, is identical to the Idea “Fido”
(since what God creates is always this or that dog, not dogness as such). This would be
consistent with Aquinas’s insistence that for angels, reflecting God, universal knowledge
includes knowledge of particulars (ST I 55.2)
51

DV 4.6; ST I 14.6; DSS 16; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 7.7 ad 5.

52

ST I 57.2.
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So the contrast between the kinds of knowing enabled by abstractive vs.
exemplar species can be put as follows (although the quantifying language
of “richer, poorer,” or “more, less” must be understood merely metaphorically). The abstracted universal “dog” is “intensionally poorer” than
any particular dog. The dog-nature as conceived through an abstracted
species is only part of the reality that is Fido, i.e., “dog” is merely “what
Fido is.” As we saw above, this partiality is imposed by the causal history
of abstracted universals: The phantasms are unable to communicate to an
abstracted species their own representational restriction to this individual
Fido. Hence there is more to Fido than an abstracted intelligible species
can capture. In contrast, the exemplar universal “Dog” is ontologically
and intensionally “richer” than any given particular dog that imitates
it. What angels apprehend when they grasp “Dog” is something that is
ontologically “more real” than the dogs that imitate it, inasmuch as uncreated being “is” to a greater degree than created being; Aquinas insists
that the nature of dogness is “more truly” in its exemplar cause than it
is in dogs themselves.53 Indeed, neither Fido nor Spot nor all actual dogs
could exhaust the ways in which dogs can be like the exemplar universal
“Dog,” and the exemplar includes all of them as its real expressions. By
analogy: Abstracted universal “dog” is related to Fido and Spot as the
concept “color” is related to the determinate colors blue and green. But
the exemplar universal “Dog” is related to various dogs as white light is
related to blue light and green light, inasmuch as at least phenomenologically, white light appears to be some one thing from which blue and green
light proceed, which is other than, and not a part of, either of them. (In
reality, white light is of course a mixture of all light wavelengths, so in that
respect the analogy falls short.)
We can thus see that angelic knowing and our embodied knowing,
for Aquinas, are fundamentally different in structure. It is not as though
angelic knowing consists in grasping an abstracted universal (“dog” abstracted from the existence of real dogs) plus a lot of existing dogs. Rather,
non-embodied minds have a wholly different mode of access to reality.
We experience reality from the bottom-up: Abstract universal knowing
is something added to our conscious experience of real things. Our grasp
of this or that dog or bird as a real existing thing is separable from our
grasp of “dog” or “bird” in the abstract. But non-embodied minds experience reality from the top-down; their experience of universality is of a
supereminently existing perfection as it is expressed in existing things, and
of those things as expressions of that preeminent perfection. “Knowing
53
See DV 4.4, where Aquinas emphasizes that the truth of a thing is more perfectly found
in God than in the thing itself, although a predicate, e.g., “dog,” is more properly applied
to the thing than to its exemplar (this is consistent with his distinction between abstracted
and emanated universals, since predication is a feature of human knowing and hence the
predicate “dog” expresses an abstracted universal). On the ways in which Aquinas allows
that divine Ideas are “more real” than the creatures that imitate them and comparison with
Plato, see Doolan, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas and the Really Real,” 1059–1091.
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the exemplar ‘Dog’” is not opposed to knowing Fido—it is the means of
knowing Fido. The way that angels apprehend Fido is precisely as a material realization or imitation of exemplar “Dog.” That is why non-embodied
and embodied knowing is different in kind.
To illustrate the difference with the case of sick Fido:54 A human veterinarian, with her knowledge of an abstracted universal “dog,” would know
what dog health should be and what kinds of physiological failures dogs
are liable to suffer. But in order to treat Fido, she needs to use her senses
to obtain information about his particular, sensorily accessible, physical
states, and apply her abstract knowledge of dog-health to Fido to produce an educated guess of what is wrong with Fido and what might cure
him. For the veterinarian’s embodied mind, universal knowledge comes
apart from the concrete existence of real dogs, and this knowledge can
only be applied by reconnecting it with these existing things. In contrast,
an angelic veterinarian who knows the exemplar “Dog” begins with the
existing source of the existence of lesser, dependent dogs: the “one” from
which the “many” dogs are, as it were, unpacked. The angel’s knowledge
does not have to be applied to the world of existents, because it is already a
knowledge of what exists: In grasping the exemplar universal “Dog,” the
angelic veterinarian already immediately grasps Fido as a created expression of that preeminent reality, and Fido’s sickness, and the appropriate
cure—not as additional bits of information alongside Fido’s dogness,
but from the top down, unfolded from what is preeminently in the
exemplar “Dog.”
This distinction in Aquinas between abstracted vs. exemplar universals resurrects a classical distinction between forms that are posterior to
and abstracted from sensory experience, and those that are prior to and
the causes of things.55 Moreover, the difference in how abstracted vs.
exemplar universals relate to particulars turns out to be merely another
way of considering Aquinas’s view that the one-way likeness relation
between intellect and object runs in different directions for embodied
vs. non-embodied cognition, as described earlier. Individual dogs are a
likeness of, and hence lesser than and derivative of, exemplar universal
“Dog”—whereas the abstracted universal “dog” is a likeness of, and
hence lesser than and derivative of, individual dogs. Abstracted “dogness”
or “dog” is the conceptualization of something real in Fido, a predicate
applicable to Fido and others of his ilk in virtue of their sharing a common
nature—whereas exemplar “Dog” is the cause of and standard for Fido in
his whole being.56 The abstracted universal is thus a “principle of cognition only,” in contrast to exemplar universals or divine Ideas, which are,
54

With thanks to a referee for suggesting this illustration.

See Helmig, Forms and Concepts, 208–221; De Libera, La querelle, 103–124, 182–185, and
245–262 (curiously overlooking Aquinas’s acceptance of this doctrine). For this distinction
in Aquinas’s teacher Albertus Magnus, see Krause and Anzulewicz, “Albert der Große”; De
Libera, “Albert le Grand,” 89–119.
55

56

On the predicability of the universale post rem, see De Libera, “Albert le Grand,” 109.
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like the Platonic Forms, principles both of cognition and of being (principium essendi).57
3. Turn to Phantasms: The Embodied Intellect’s Partnership with Imagination
We can now see that the significance of there being two different causes of
intellectual assimilation (God causing exemplar-like species that are like
the divine Ideas, vs. physical objects causing abstracted species that are
like the nature of a dog), is that these causes produce different kinds of
universal knowledge. By exemplar-like species, a non-embodied intellect
apprehends the exemplar universal “Dog,” and in doing so apprehends
Fido as a unique if limited expression of this ontologically richer idea. By
abstracted species, an embodied intellect apprehends something of Fido,
the essence that constitutes him as a dog, and that he shares with other
dogs. These are differently-structured intellectual experiences, different
kinds of mental states.
The effect of embodiment on the human experience of understanding
now begins to come clear. Our intellectual grasp of Fido is limited to his
membership in a certain kind. If we attempt to consider what it is to be a
dog, apart from our experiences of existing dogs, we seem to be trying to
grasp something abstract, thinner, more uncertain, and less real than the
dogs encountered in sense experience—precisely because an embodied
understanding grasps “dog” as an abstraction from what really exists.58
Universality, as we experience it, ultimately consists in no more than a
concept’s indifferent applicability to many individuals, because it falls
short of capturing their complete being.
With all this in mind, it is now possible to give a new rationale for
Aquinas’s much-discussed claim that embodied knowers can know
only by “turning to phantasms.” Interpreters have disagreed about how
strictly this requirement holds, and what phenomenon he has in mind. He
is taken, variously, (1) to be asserting, as a brute psychological fact, that
all our thinking is accompanied by mental picturing,59 or (2) more loosely
to be describing some sort of pedagogical role of images in our abstract
thinking: e.g., that concrete illustrations are useful (but not necessary) in
helping us to grasp abstract concepts,60 or that our intellects are naturally
“oriented” toward imagination.61
57
ST I 85.3 ad 1 and ad 4; I 15.1. Aquinas also sometimes calls abstracted universals “universal forms” and the divine Ideas “universal causes” (DV 2.4 ad 7), though these terms also
have other usages.
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De spiritualibus creaturis 9 ad 6, reporting the Aristotelian position that Aquinas accepts.
The view is reflected in ST I 85.3 ad 4; as well as I 85.1 ad 1; I 85.2 ad 2.
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Lonergan, ‘Verbum’: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 160; and Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 93–99.

Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 289–295. For Pasnau, the “turn” refers to the
experience of coming up with examples and pictures in the process of trying to understand
an abstract concept.
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Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 142; Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge
of the Singular,” 148–150.

Faith and Philosophy

436

Elsewhere I argued that Aquinas’s account of “turning to phantasms”
is in part a claim about the embodied intellect’s natural orientation to
imagination, but that the implications for occurrent abstract thinking remained to be made clear.62 I now want to spell out those implications, and
my proposal is as follows: For Aquinas, our abstract thinking necessarily
includes an imaginative component—but not for psychological or pedagogical reasons, as though the embodied mind needs a constant stream of
illustrations in its attempt to digest abstract concepts. Rather, the reason is
that the kind of abstract thinking that we do (given the kind of universals
we know) cannot fully assimilate us to real things without being completed by an imaginative component. In other words, embodiment not
only determines what we know by abstracted species, but also shapes the way
in which we exercise abstracted species and understand abstracted universals.63 The way in which abstracted species ought properly to be exercised
in an intellectual act—indeed, the only way they can be exercised by an
embodied intellect—is what Aquinas calls “understanding by turning to
phantasms.” So embodied knowing is fundamentally an imagistic mode
of knowing (taking “imagistic” broadly to indicate a variety of sensory
content, not merely visual content), in the sense that it essentially has an
imaginative component. It is not a complete mode of cognition in itself
which also happens to be accompanied by phantasms.
Let us see how this works. The much-discussed ST I 84.7c tells us why
the embodied intellect must cognize by turning to phantasms:
The proper object of the human intellect that is conjoined to a body is the
quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. . . . But it belongs to such a
nature (de ratione autem huius naturae est) to exist in some individual, which
does not lack corporeal matter. For instance, it belongs to the nature of stone
to be in some individual stone (de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc
lapide64), and to the nature of horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth.
Thus the nature of stone, or of any material thing, cannot be cognized completely and truly unless it is cognized as existing in a particular (ut in particulari existens). But we apprehend the particular exclusively by sense and
imagination. And therefore if the intellect is to understand its proper object,
it must turn itself toward phantasms, so that it may behold the universal
nature existing in the particular. If the proper object of our intellect were
separate forms, or if the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from particulars as the Platonists thought, then our intellect would not always have
to turn itself toward phantasms in understanding.
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Cory, “What Is an Intellectual ‘Turn’?,” 129–162.

This distinction between what we know (in virtue of the species) and how we know it
(in virtue of the mode of the act) is made clearly in ST I 89.6c.
63

64
Obviously Aquinas does not mean that stoneness essentially belongs to this specific
individual stone, e.g., the Hope Diamond, or there could only be one stone, the Hope Diamond (see De ente et essentia 3). Rather, as my translation attempts to clarify, the quiddities of
material entities necessarily exist in some individual.
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It is significant that Aquinas justifies the “turn to phantasms” by underscoring the insufficiency of our intellectual assimilation to reality by means of an
abstracted species. What we understand when we grasp abstracted “dog”
is the “whatness” or “quiddity” (quidditas) that makes Fido be a dog.
The quiddity “dog” properly exists only in individual physical dogs and
derivatively in embodied knowers. (In contrast, the exemplar universal
“Dog” that angels contemplate, properly exists independently from, and
prior to, dogs).
As a result, fascinatingly, it turns out that “individualized physical
being” is not accidental to “the quiddity of dogs” in the same way that,
say, to “belonging to Mrs. Smith” is. It is possible to be a dog without belonging to Mrs. Smith, whereas nothing can be a dog unless it is individual
and physical.65 Consequently, as Aquinas here concludes, the quiddity
“dog” that we understand by abstraction cannot be “completely and
truly” cognized unless it is cognized as existing in a materially individuated
way in some individual dog. The “as” (ut or prout) is significant, since for
Aquinas, to grasp something “as existing” is to have experiential access
to that thing, analogous to visiting Mont-Saint-Michel in person instead
of merely reading about it in a guidebook.66 So the point is that a “complete and true” cognition of the quiddity of material dogs requires a direct
experiential assimilation to some real dog in which that quiddity really,
physically, individually exists (or at least some dog imagined as existing
in this way). But such direct assimilation to an individually existing dog
is exactly what an abstracted species cannot deliver, for reasons already
discussed.
As a result, the abstracted intelligible species turns out, astonishingly,
to be inadequate to the task of perfectly assimilating the embodied intellect to its own proper object, the quiddity of material beings.67 Such
quiddities can be cognized as they are in reality only by cognizing “the
quiddity as it is in an individual.” So our “complete and true” assimilation
to dog-essence in its real being must be completed by an embodied power
that is capable of assimilating to individuals: namely, the imagination.
Thus when I cognize “the quiddity as it is in an individual,” my intellect
provides the assimilation to the quiddity “dog,” which is cognized “as it is
in an individual” only because the imagination provides the assimilation
to an individual, physical Fido, by means of the phantasm that is Fido’s

65
Indeed, Aquinas’s criticism of Plato’s doctrine of Forms is precisely for holding—as
Aquinas thinks—that the natures of physical things (what we grasp by abstraction) subsist
separately from those things, as though individuality and materiality were merely accidental
to such natures. This criticism does not exclude a doctrine of divine Ideas, because these are
not subsistent versions of abstracted universals, but rather the preeminent causes of physical, individualized dogs. See Doolan, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas and the Really Real,” 1076,
discussing DV 4.6, ad 2 s.c.; and Owens, “Thomistic Common Nature,” 211–215.
66

See ST I 57.2.
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likeness.68 The “turn to phantasms,” then, is precisely the activation of an
abstracted species in a cognition composed of intellectual and imaginative
acts, cooperating in a broader “complete and true cognition of the quiddity
of a material entity as it exists” (and note Aquinas’s use of the generic term
cognoscere instead of intelligere, as though to underscore that a “complete
and true cognition of the quiddity” cannot be exclusively intellectual).
As a result, we can see that for Aquinas, “to cognize by turning to
phantasms” is to use an abstracted species as part of a cooperative activity performed by intellect and imagination together. In this composite
activity, the human knower apprehends the quiddity of material entities
as existing in some corporeal individual (“the essence of this entity”), with
intellect responsible for the quiddity (“the essence of . . . ”) and imagination supplying the corporeal individual existence of that quiddity in some
object of experience (“ . . . this entity”).69 So the turn to phantasms is partly
a “cognitive orientation”70 in the sense that abstracted species intrinsically
refer to existing individuals present to the senses and/or imagination.71
But orientation does not tell the whole story: The orientation is cashed out
in the conjoint activity of intellect and imagination directing the knower’s
attention to the quiddities of material things as they exist in an individual,
physical way as this or that material individual—jointly grasping such
quiddities in the only way in which they can exist. This imagistic knowing,
the joint intellectual-imaginative “knowing by turning to phantasms,” is
precisely the embodied mode of knowing.
4. What Is It Like To Be an Embodied Knower?
We can now put together a relatively complete picture of how embodiment affects “what it is like” for us to cognize. The essential
features of an embodied-type cognition are all traceable to the intrinsically
downward-referring and incomplete character of the kind of universal that is
grasped through abstraction from sensory experience. An abstracted species is
congenitally incomplete in assimilating us to real beings. And this incompleteness is remedied by the corporeal power of imagination, which fills
in the determinate likenesses to which the intellect is indifferent: “Dog”
is the essence of Fido. Thus the human knower can only be assimilated to
the whole Fido by means of imagination and intellect together—the imagination assimilated to Fido as this individual existing here and now, and
the intellect assimilated to Fido as belonging to a certain kind.72 Acting
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See ST I 85.1c.

Klubertanz explicates our “indirect” cognition of singulars in just this way, but curiously
without any association with the turn to phantasms; “Knowledge of the Singular,” 160–161.
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Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 142; compare Pasnau’s opposing view, Aquinas on
Human Nature, 289–295.
71
I analyze this reference in terms of Neoplatonic concepts of “likeness,” in “What Is an
Intellectual ‘Turn’?”
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ST I-II 4.5; SCG II 60.
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together, these cooperative cognitive powers enable the human being to
become cognitively assimilated to Fido as this dog existing here and now.
To put it another way, we not only first encounter essences individualized as the particulars of sense experience, but also properly understand
essences as what makes those particulars be what they are. And that is why
Aquinas insists that “the human intellect cannot grasp bare intelligible
truth [as angels do], for it is connatural to it to understand by turning
to phantasms.”73 He does not mean that embodied knowers cannot have
genuine thoughts about “dog.” Nor does he mean that embodied knowers
must compulsively pair every thought about abstract “dog” with a corresponding image of some concrete dog, while angels are free to exercise the
same concept without the baggage of phantasms. Rather, he means that what
we grasp when we think by means of the abstracted species “dog” is ontologically incomplete and indeed not even fully comprehensible, apart from a
physical individual. In short, embodied knowing is of its very nature an
insight about physical individuals: the quiddity of a material individual,
the essence of a dog, “what it is to be” a dog, the “whatness” of “this.”74
The embodied intellect’s cooperation with and completion by physical
mental processes explains why it is accidentally subject to duration and
distance, despite the fact that in itself, the intellect does not fall under the
categories of place and time.75 My intellect is not “in” my brain except
accidentally, insofar as it cooperates with my imagination located in my
brain. Similarly, although the intellection of “dog” itself takes up no time
at all, I can be said to be “thinking about dogs for a long time” because
my dog-directed intellectual acts are completed by imaginative acts that
do have duration.
5. The Concertgoing Angel?
In the introduction, I mentioned a second puzzle that one might raise
in evaluating how embodiment shapes conscious experience: namely,
whether the experiences that are linked, in us, to physiological structures
are possible only for embodied minds. The puzzle can be considered in
light of the thought-experiment of a concertgoing angel: Would it have (i)
the experience that we call “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth,” or (ii) a different
kind of experience of musical sounds, or (iii) no experience of musical
sounds at all? Given what has just been said, it seems clear that Aquinas
would have to deny (i). Experiences differ in kind, as we have seen, according to the different kinds of cognitive powers. Angels are purely
intellectual; so they cannot have the kind of experience that is proper to
73

ST I 111.1.

Aquinas holds that disembodied souls can also use previously-abstracted species despite lacking imagination (ST I 89.6). His view seems to be, then, that using the abstracted
species necessarily elicits the completing act in the imagination unless impeded by the absence
of a properly disposed imagination—not that abstractive species can never be used without
imagination.
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ST I 85.4 ad 1; I 85.5 ad 2; I-II 113.7 ad 5; SCG II 96; In De memoria et reminiscentia 2.
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sense. To put it another way: Since angelic knowing differs in kind from
embodied knowing, which differs in kind from sensation, and since angels have no kind of experience other than knowing, angelic mental states
must differ in kind from sensation.
Such observations might seem to suggest that Aquinas will have to
defend (iii). Indeed, although our focus so far has been on the Aquinas
scholarship’s tendency to define our embodied intellectual activity in
terms of deficiency, if one instead considered non-embodied vs. embodied
conscious experience as a whole, then one might just as well have come to the
opposite conclusion: It looks as though angels must be the ones who are
deficient cognizers, since they lack all the bodily cognitive powers that
are responsible for so much of the richness of our mental life in Aquinas’s
theory of cognition. When we try to imagine “what it is like” to cognize
as an angel, from our embodied perspective, we must strip away familiar
experiences like “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth” or “feeling the warmth of a
fire.” In the end, very little mental life seems to be left, and what there is
seems to be excessively remote, abstract, and theoretical. When Aquinas
insists that angels cognize particulars such as this symphony performance
intellectually rather than sensorially, it is easy to conclude that their “experience” of Beethoven’s Ninth consists in a comprehensive knowledge
of all true propositions about it, as though the angel were a recluse who
preferred to stay at home extensively reading about Beethoven’s Ninth
instead of hearing the performance. (Something of this worry appears in
some contemporary critiques of Aquinas’s account of God’s knowledge of
particulars.76)
But Aquinas rejects (iii): He insists that non-embodied created intellects
have all the concreteness and immediacy to a present singular that humans
can attain only by sensing that singular.77 Aquinas’s characterizations of
exemplar vs. abstracted universals, above, helps explain why. A purely
intellectual mode of experience might seem thin and inadequate only if
we project on angels the “thinness” or “abstractness” of our own abstractive understanding, which prescinds from the existence of the reality. For
embodied minds, it is one thing to know everything about Beethoven’s
Ninth—and another thing altogether to hear the performance. It is one thing
to understand what fire is, or what warmth is, or (propositionally) that the
fire is warm—and another thing altogether to feel this fire’s warmth, to see,
hear, and touch what the fire is like. So in conceptualizing pure non-embodied
intellection, prescinding from the sensory-imaginative aspects of our own
embodied cognition, it seems that what must be left is radically truncated:
an unfinished grasp of “the essence of—”. But that truncated insight,
demanding completion by the imagination, is proper to an embodied
mode of intellectual experience. This is not how angels intellectually
experience reality.
76
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See, e.g., Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” 127–133.
ST I 57.2.
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So it seems to me that the view that Aquinas would embrace is (ii):
The exemplar universals that angels apprehend do provide an experience
of particulars such as this particular symphony performance. But their
experience must be of another order from our own, since they experience
particulars “top-down” as the expressions of a universal exemplar. Assuming that there is some divine exemplar “Music” for the compositions
and performances that God causes to exist in our world through human
musicians as secondary causes, our concertgoing angel (and indeed any
angel) would have something like our experience of “hearing Beethoven’s
Ninth”—except that the experience would be something other than
“hearing.” Again, an angel on a campground would not merely cognize
propositionally that this fire is burning at such-and-such a temperature,
but would directly and concretely apprehend the warmth of this campfire
in an experience analogous to sensory feeling.
The rationale lies in Aquinas’s theory of exemplar universals: The exemplar universal apprehended by non-embodied created intellects is not
an incompletely-apprehended quiddity of a material thing in the manner of our
abstracted universals. Rather, it is a created reflection of the divine Idea
“Music” or “Fire,” something ontologically complete in itself, which is
not indifferent to particulars, but is the preeminent cause of the entire being of
all musical instantiations or fires, of which particular instances are expressions, down to the very core of their being. Thus an angelic intellectual
experience encompasses what fire is and what this particular created fire
is like—not in the manner of two different pieces of information, but as
dimensions of a single experience of the being of fire.
Since we do not have experiences of this sort, but approach reality in
a different mode through the collaboration of intellect and imagination/
sense, it is impossible for us to grasp exactly what this angelic mode of
intellectual experiencing is like. The best we can do, perhaps, is to suggest speculatively two ways in which an angelic “what it is like” must
differ from ours, given Aquinas’s distinctions between embodied and
non-embodied knowing. First, Aquinas notes that because they lack sense
and imagination, angels do not encounter material particulars as potentially intelligible and hence needing to be made intelligible,78 because particulars
are already actually intelligible through the divine exemplars that angels
grasp. Angels do not experience material particulars, in short, as lacking
intelligibility. It is, perhaps, therefore not too much of a stretch to conclude
thence that angels, on Aquinas’s account, simply do not experience reality
at all in terms of the familiar tension between “what seems to the senses”
vs. “what is known to the intellect”—a tension unavoidable for embodied
knowers and which gives rise to the faint suspicion of the treacheries of
sensory appearance that has haunted philosophy since Parmenides.
Second, Aquinas’s account of non-embodied cognition seems clearly
to deny to angels and disembodied souls something essential to our
78
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embodied experience of physical objects: namely, the experience of “what
it is like to sense,” the “phenomenal feel” of the sense organ’s being altered
in perception. Given what we have seen about exemplar universals in
Aquinas, it seems that in apprehending the fire’s warmth, an angel would
grasp “what hot fire is like,” but not “what it is like to sense heat.” In other
words, the angelic experience of the fire would lack our familiar feeling of
skin warming up as one approaches the fire; and the concertgoing angel’s
experience of a symphony performance would lack the feeling of being
shaken by waves of orchestral sound. (Indeed, Aquinas rejects a Patristic
idea that the torment of the damned by physical fire consists in an intellectual pain of being burned, for, he argues, only a physical change in the
flesh could “introduce” the pain of being burned.79) It seems, then, that on
his view, the phenomenal feel of being sensibly affected by a physical object is
intellectually irreproducible.
6. Conclusion
Embodied-type intellection, then, is defined by its causal origin from and
orientation toward physical individuals. Our embodied “mode of understanding” (modus intelligendi) is “by abstracting from and turning to
phantasms,” whereas non-embodied intellects understand “by turning to
intelligible things,”80 i.e., the divine exemplars. Abstracted species, caused
by physical individuals through imagination, assimilate the intellect to
“the quiddity of material things,” whose universality (in the sense of indifference to many particulars) leaves our assimilation to reality incomplete
without the contribution of the imagination. In other words, the embodied
way of grasping essences is to grasp what is indeterminate to particulars,
with reference to some particular: Dogness is the essence of a particular,
“what it is to be that kind of being.” To put it another way, the human
being not only is a hylormorphic being, but also knows quasi-hylomorphically, assimilated by multiple cognitive powers to the whole of the real
Fido as an individual existent of a certain kind.
Our existence as intellectual organisms with our “hybrid” manner
of knowing opens up an interesting possibility in the created order.
Abstractive intellection, unique to embodied intellects, is the only kind
of intellection that allows material objects to exercise agency vis-à-vis
intellects, causing an abstracted likeness of themselves in us with the assistance of the agent intellect. Our intellects thus provide the opportunity
for material objects to take on this noble role as co-agents of intellectual
insight.
I would like to conclude by highlighting an unresolved puzzle in
Aquinas’s account of embodied knowing. The human existence with
which we are familiar is an embodied existence, and so our questions
about the peculiarly human way of knowing tend to be questions about
79
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knowing in this embodied state. Consequently, it is easy to assume that
Aquinas’s claims about our embodied, abstractive knowing are claims
about how a human intellect must operate. But I have deliberately avoided
making claims about the “human mode of knowing,” because it is not the
case that Aquinas thinks the human intellect can only cognize abstractively by its nature. The disembodied human soul after death, for instance,
becomes de facto a “separated substance,” and as we have seen, the nature
of separated substances is to reflect the Divine Ideas. So the disembodied
human soul now instantly acquires exemplar-like species and understands by those species in the manner of an angel—and Aquinas stresses
that the reception of such species is natural to the human intellect in that
disembodied state.81
So it looks as though the two kinds of knowing that I have been describing should not be characterized as the acts of two different kinds of
intellects, i.e., the human and the angelic, but rather as the acts of intellects
that stand in a certain relation (or not) to matter, i.e., the embodied and the
non-embodied.82 But that characterization raises unsettling anthropological questions. If the human intellect is naturally capable of either mode
of intellection, why do we not receive exemplar species right now in an
embodied state? Aquinas seems to suggest that the very state of embodiment itself restricts us to an abstractive mode of cognition. “It is impossible
for our intellect, in the present state of life in which it is conjoined to a
passible body, to understand anything actually except by turning itself
to phantasms.”83 But if corporeality itself is the culprit, then embodiment
seems to place us at a cognitive disadvantage by cutting us off from a
“more eminent” mode of intellection, contrary to Aquinas’s assertion that
embodiment is for the good of the human intellect. And in any case, why
should embodiment prevent us from receiving species that our intellect is
naturally capable of receiving? The situation is complicated by Aquinas’s
tendency to insist that even the supernatural action of higher intellects
on the embodied human knower conforms to this restriction—with a few
curious exceptions that seem to follow no obvious pattern. Resolution of
these difficulties, however, must be left for a later inquiry.84
University of Notre Dame

See ST Ia 89.1.
Disembodied souls can use their previously-acquired abstracted species, but in an incomplete way, since once separated from the brain, they no longer turn to phantasms. See
ST Ia 89.5–6.
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ST Ia 84.7: “[I]mpossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum,
quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.”
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